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Abstract: In a simple energy-market structure consisting of natural gas and electricity suppliers, suppliers 
exercise market power by adjusting their production levels to influence the market price. This is done with 
the aim of maximizing their individual profits. This paper examines the impact of vertical integration, 
whereby firms supply both natural gas and electricity, on market efficiency. Market equilibria, which is 
the point at which no firm has incentive to deviate unilaterally, was modeled using a computational 
approach. Stylized profit-maximization problems were examined with vertically integrated and dis-
integrated firms using a quantity-setting Nash-Cournot framework. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions 
are used to characterize optimal solutions to the firms’ profit-maximization problems. Combining the KKT 
conditions of all of the firms allows us to compute market equilibria efficiently. The complementarity 
framework is used to examine the incentives of integrated and dis-integrated firms to exercise market 
power in one or both of the markets. Comprehensive case studies that are reflective of real-world energy 
systems are used to examine the impacts of potential mergers between natural gas and electric firms on 
market efficiency. This work can inform policy makers and regulators in determining how markets should 
be structured to ensure increased efficiency. Policy makers and regulators could employ a modeling 
technique, such as the one developed in this paper, to screen potential vertical mergers in energy and 
other market settings. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy markets are often a focus of operations research. Different optimization problems can be 
used to model markets and predict their behavior. Insights from models like these can benefit 
decision making within companies and policy making from regulators. Throughout these models, 
however, the key component that tends to be missing is vertical integration. Vertical integration is 
when a firm owns multiple steps in the supply chain (Amadeo et al). In the context of energy 
markets, this can mean a firm owns both natural gas plants, which produce and sell natural gas, 
and electricity plants, which buy that natural gas as fuel to produce electricity. Being involved in 
multiple levels of the supply chain has the potential to increase a firm’s capacity to exercise market 
power. A firm uses market power to manipulate the price of a market commodity, such as natural 
gas and electricity. By exploring the scarcely explored effects of vertical integration, this research 
has the potential to discover crucial information regarding the impacts on different players in the 
market. 
An important concept when analyzing energy markets is social welfare, which is the sum 
of consumer welfare and producer welfare. Social welfare can be considered the total benefit to all 
parties. Consumer welfare is the difference between the price a consumer is theoretically willing 
to pay and the actual price. Mathematically, it is the area between the demand curve and the price, 
which is computed as the integral under the demand curve minus the area below the price. Producer 
welfare is the difference between the price a producer is theoretically willing to sell for and the 
actual price. Mathematically, it is the difference between the area above the supply curve and 
below the price, which is computed as the area below the price minus the integral of the supply 
curve. The value of producer welfare, consumer welfare, and overall social welfare can be 
calculated at a given market equilibrium. This is a key component of analyzing the effects of 
different manipulations of the market structure.  
There are two aims of this research. The first aim is to explore how to represent vertical 
integration using complementarity models. Vertical integration has not been modeled using 
complementarity models in prior literature. This research works to develop a modeling framework 
that better represents vertical integration in energy markets. The second aim is to use the model to 
examine the impact of vertical integration on the market efficiency. Different levels of integration 
will be modeled, solved, and analyzed. Social welfare will be used as a metric, along with market 
prices and production quantities, to see which parties benefit and which are harmed by merger. 
This information can be crucial to outside regulators to ensure that regulations are made to benefit 
social welfare and protect consumers from excessive abuse of market power. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will discuss the methodology used 
in this research. Section 3 will discuss the Nash Cournot model developed. Section 4 will then present the 
results from an examination of merger. Finally, Section 5 section will discuss potential future directions 
for this research. 
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2. Methodology 
This project has an iterative structure that involves 5 main steps. These steps are listed below. 
 
1. Formulate Model 
2. Program Model using GAMS 
3. Check Model Accuracy 
4. Manipulate Market Structure 
5. Analyze Results 
 
During the “Formulate Model” step, the desired market structure is formulated as a 
complementarity model. During the “Program Model in GAMS” step, the formulation is converted 
into KKT conditions so that the equilibrium can be solved by a nonlinear or mixed integer solver 
using the GAMS software package. These equations will then be coded into GAMS using the 
algebraic modeling language (AML). During the “Check Model Accuracy” step, the GAMS model 
will be solved and the solution analyzed to ensure that the model is behaving as expected. During 
the “Manipulate Market Structure” step, the formulation will be adjusted to reflect different market 
situations, such as varying levels of vertical integration. During the “Analyze Results” step, the 
solutions that are provided by GAMS during the previous step will be analyzed to find insights on 
the relationships between market structure and outcomes.  
Energy markets are commonly represented using a complementarity model. A 
complementarity model is a method of modeling and solving optimization problems that involves 
converting the optimization problem into a set of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, or KKT 
conditions. KKT conditions are a series of necessary conditions that must be satisfied if a given 
solution is optimal. For the generic optimization problem 
min
௫
𝑓(𝑥) (1) 
ℎ௜(𝑥) = 0, ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 (2) 
𝑔௝(𝑥) ≤ 0, ∀𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 (3) 
where 𝑓(𝑥), ℎ௜(𝑥), and 𝑔௝(𝑥) are continuously differentiable, an optimal solution, 𝑥∗, must satisfy the 
following KKT conditions  
∇ 𝑓(𝑥∗) + ෍ 𝜆௜
∗∇ℎ௜(𝑥∗)
௠
௜ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝜇௝∗∇𝑔௝(𝑥∗)
௡
௝ୀଵ
= 0 (4) 
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𝑔௝(𝑥∗)𝜇௝∗ = 0, ∀𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 (5) 
𝜇௝∗ ≥ 0, ∀𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 (6) 
ℎ௜(𝑥∗) = 0, ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 (7) 
where 𝜆௜∗ and 𝜇௝∗ are the Lagrangian multipliers of the optimization problem and 𝑥∗ is regular. Condition 
(4) is the stationarity condition. Condition (5) is the complementary slackness condition. Condition (6) is 
the Lagrangian non-negativity condition. Condition (7) is the equality constraint. 
  If 𝑓(𝑥) is convex, ℎ௜(𝑥) are linear, and 𝑔௝(𝑥) ≤ 0 are convex, then these KKT conditions are 
sufficient to determine that the solution 𝑥∗ is globally optimal. Using these KKT conditions allows 
for multiple optimization problems to be solved simultaneously to reach an equilibrium. 
 
3. Nash Cournot Model 
The wholesale market price of natural gas and electricity are each determined by an inverse demand 
function. These functions are defined as 
𝐴ீ − 𝐵ீ𝑟ீ  (8) 
𝐴ா − 𝐵ா𝑟ா (9) 
where 𝐴ீ  and 𝐵ீ  are the inverse demand parameters of the natural gas firm, 𝐴ா  and 𝐵ா  are the inverse 
demand parameters of the electricity firm, and 𝑟ீ  and 𝑟ா  are the retail demand of natural gas and 
electricity respectively. 𝑟ீ  and 𝑟ா  can be defined as 
𝑟ீ = ෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
 (10) 
𝑟ா = ෍(𝑞௡ா)
௡
 (11) 
where 𝑞௠ீ  and 𝑞௡ா are the production quantities of natural gas firm m and electricity firm n respectively 
and 𝜂௡ is the heat rate of firm n. A heat rate is the ratio between the thermal energy that goes in an 
electricity-producing mechanism and the electricity that comes out. For practical purposes, it is the 
conversion between gas fuel and electricity. 
The firms are modeled as profit-maximizers. Profit per unit is defined as the wholesale market 
price per unit minus the production cost per unit. Multiplying the profit per unit by the units of production 
for a firm gives that firm’s total profit. The profit of natural gas firm i is thus defined as 
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൭𝐴ீ − 𝐵ீ ൭෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ − 𝑐௜ீ൱ 𝑞௜ீ  (12) 
where 𝑐௜ீ  is the production cost per unit of natural gas of firm i.  The production of natural gas is subject 
to a non-negativity constraint and a production capacity constraint, which can be defined for firm i 
respectively as 
𝑞௜ீ ≥ 0 (13) 
𝑞௜ீ ≤ 𝐶௉௜
ீ  (14) 
where 𝐶௉௜
ீ  is the natural gas production capacity of firm i. 
Electricity firms may use natural gas as a fuel, meaning that the production cost also includes the 
fuel cost, which is the wholesale price of natural gas multiplied by the heat rate of the electricity firm. 
With this fuel cost included, the profit of electricity firm j is defined as 
ቌ𝐴ா − 𝐵ா ൭෍(𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ − 𝑐௝ா + ቌ𝐴ீ − 𝐵ீ ൭෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ቍ 𝜂௝ቍ 𝑞௝ா  (15) 
where 𝑐௝ா  is the non-fuel production cost per unit of electricity of firm j. The production of electricity is 
subject to a non-negativity constraint and a production capacity constraint, which can be defined for firm 
j respectively as 
𝑞௝ா ≥ 0 (16) 
𝑞௝ா ≤ 𝐶௉௝
ா  (17) 
where 𝐶௉௝
ா  is the electricity production capacity of firm j. 
The integrated firms are simply modeled as the profit maximization of the summation of the 
profits from natural gas as defined in (12) and the profits from electricity as defined in (15), subject to the 
constraints of both markets defined in (13)-(14) and (16)-(17). Integrated firm k is thus formulated as 
max
௤ೖಸ,௤ೖಶ
൭𝐴ீ − 𝐵ீ ൭෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ − 𝑐௞ீ൱ 𝑞௞ீ
+ ቌ𝐴ா − 𝐵ா ൭෍(𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ − 𝑐௞ா + ቌ𝐴ீ − 𝐵ீ ൭෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ቍ 𝜂௞ቍ 𝑞௞ா 
(18) 
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𝑞௞ீ ≥ 0 (19) 
𝑞௞ா ≥ 0 (20) 
𝑞௞ீ ≤ 𝐶௉௞
ீ (21) 
𝑞௞ா ≤ 𝐶௉௞
ா (22) 
All three types of firms can be formulated as an integrated firm as shown in problem (18)-(22). If 
firm k is a natural gas only firm, it can be formulated as integrated firm simply by setting the production 
capacity of electricity for firm k, 𝐶௉௞
ா, equal to zero. The combination of constraints (20) and (22) would 
require 𝑞௞ா = 0. Similarly, if firm k is an electricity only firm, it can be formulated as integrated firm simply 
by setting the production capacity of natural gas for firm k, 𝐶௉௞
ீ, equal to zero. The combination of 
constraints (19) and (21) would require 𝑞௞ீ = 0. No changes need to be made to problem (18)-(22) if firm 
k is an integrated firm. Using complementarity principles, each optimization problem is converted to KKT 
Conditions shown below 
−𝐴ீ + 𝐵ீ ൭෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ + 𝑐௞ீ + 𝐵ீ𝑞௞ீ − 𝐵ீ𝜂௞𝑞௞ா − 𝜇ଵ௞ + 𝜇ଷ௞ = 0 (23) 
𝐵ீ𝜂௞𝑞௞ீ − 𝐴ா + 𝐵ா ෍(𝑞௡ா)
௡
+ 𝑐௞ா + ቌ𝐴ீ − 𝐵ீ ൭෍(𝑞௠
ீ)
௠
− ෍(𝜂௡𝑞௡ா)
௡
൱ቍ 𝜂௞ + 𝐵ா𝑞௞ா
+ 𝐵ீ𝜂௞ଶ𝑞௞ா − 𝜇ଶ௞ + 𝜇ସ௞ = 0 
(24) 
𝜇ଵ௞(−𝑞௞
ீ) = 0 (25) 
𝜇ଶ௞(−𝑞௞
ா) = 0 (26) 
𝜇ଷ௞൫𝑞௞
ீ − 𝐶௉௞
ீ൯ = 0 (27) 
𝜇ସ௞൫𝑞௞
ா − 𝐶௉௞
ா൯ = 0 (28) 
𝜇ଵ௞ ≥ 0 (29) 
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𝜇ଶ௞ ≥ 0 (30) 
𝜇ଷ௞ ≥ 0 (31) 
𝜇ସ௞ ≥ 0 (32) 
where conditions (23) and (24) are the stationarity conditions defined in equation (4), conditions (25)-(28) 
are the complementary slackness conditions defined in equation (5), and conditions (30)-(33) are the 
Lagrangian non-negativity constraints defined in equation (6). These sets of KKT Conditions for each firm 
are then solved simultaneously as a system of equations to find a market equilibrium. 
 
4. Results 
The Nash Cournot Model developed in the previous section was used to study merger. The parameters 
were set to the arbitrary values below. 
𝐴ீ = 30 
𝐵ீ = 3 
𝑐௞ீ = 2, ∀𝑘 
𝐶௉௞
ீ = 20, ∀𝑘 
𝐴ா = 30 
𝐵ா = 3 
𝑐௞ா = 2, ∀𝑘 
𝐶௉௞
ா = 20, ∀𝑘 
𝜂௞ = 0.05, ∀𝑘 
For this study, a small model with two natural gas firms and two electricity firms was used to examine 
how merger impacts the market efficiency. Case 1 is a scenario without any vertical integration. Case 2 
has one natural gas firm merged with one electricity firm to create a market with one integrated firm and 
two disintegrated firms (one of each commodity). Case 3 has both natural gas firms each merged with an 
electricity firm to create a market with two integrated firms and no disintegrated firms. These four firms 
over these three cases are described in figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Firm type key of merger case study. 
 
These three cases were run using GAMS. Figure 2 below presents the key metrics of the equilibrium, 
including an examination of the firm profits, market clearing price, and welfare at the market equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 2: Key metrics of case study examination of merger. 
 
As seen by the metrics in Figure 2, changes caused by merger were negligible. According to these results, 
merger does not significantly impact the market equilibrium. 
 
5. Future Work 
Moving forward with this research, the stationarity conditions will be examined analytically. This should 
uncover how the incentives of each firm change as parameters change, as well as the differences between 
the incentives of natural gas firms, electric firms, and integrated firms. Better understanding the 
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incentives of firms through the analytical analysis of stationarity conditions will help to predict the results 
of different market manipulations as well as explaining the results seen in case studies, such as the results 
from the previous section. 
The parameters used in Section 4 were chosen arbitrarily and the differences in equilibrium due 
to merger were negligible. It is possible that non-arbitrary parameters may produce non-negligible 
differences in equilibrium. Moving forward, the Nash Cournot Model formulated earlier will be calibrated 
to produce a more realistic version of the model. Data from the United States Energy Information 
Administration will be examined to determine realistic market parameters and values, and then those 
values will be used to create a calibrated model. 
The effects of merger can be studying using this new calibrated model. I hypothesize that an 
integrated firm with electricity production dependent on natural gas as a fuel will be incentivized to 
produce more natural gas in order to drive the prices of fuel down. Manipulation of the market such as 
this may have negative impacts on the welfare of the system. 
Beyond the scope of this research, there is the potential for the model to be expanded for other 
uses. A user-friendly version of the model may be developed for policy makers and regulators. Such a 
model could assist in determining market structure and screening potential mergers. In addition, a more 
generalized model could be developed so that it may be adapted to accommodate other markets with a 
similar structure. 
 
References 
Amadeo, Kimberly. “Vertical Integration, Its Pros and Cons with Examples .” The Balance, 
Dotdash, 5 Nov. 2018, www.thebalance.com/what-is-vertical-integration-3305807. Accessed 
7 May 2019 
 
